The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East

Enjoyed reading this book ....

It is convincing enough to assume that there exists post-American Middle East which creates a kind of power (geo-political) vacuum to entice Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey into competing with the dwindling influence of the United States (US) in the Middle East; the battle for Syria is one such example where external forces are contending for dictating their terms. This is the central idea of the book.In the post-Cold war era, Syria has been enjoying an interesting combination of dynasty and socialism, led by President Bashar al-Assad, who belongs to Shia Alawi minority tribe (12% of the population) ruling over the Sunni Arab majority (65%). After December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in Tunisia and sparked the Arab Spring of awakening, Deraa was the first Syrian city where anti-Assad slogans were heard from teenagers in early March 2011. The latent period of two and a half months was enough to let the Syrian regime brace the challenge.On page 48, Phillips writes: “[I]t is quite possible that Syrians would have remained largely passive were it not for the trigger of the Arab Spring, which served as both an inspiration and a guide…Technology helped facilitate protest…It took days and weeks for Syrians and the world to learn about the Hama massacre in [February] 1982 [to quell the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood], but in 2011 technology [e.g. internet, satellite television, Smartphone, social media and al-Jazeera] allowed instant information.” Here, whereas Phillips says that the presence or absence of technology to spread information makes a difference between the reaction of people to incidents in 1982 and 2011, he does not mention the significance of the authenticity of information to be spread through technology. Ironically, Phillips does not value the role of Wikileaks for giving people access to the raw truth – and not disinformation – spread through the prevailing technology in Tunisia leading to the Arab Spring in 2011. In the bibliography section, only one reference about Wikileaks – and that is related to “Ankara’s new foreign policy” – is found on page 288. Perhaps, Phillips does not appreciate that, more than technology, the difference lies in the legitimacy of information being bandied about, and that the revelation of information through Wikileaks became the immediate reason for the making of the Arab Spring.Phillips differentiates between uprising and civil war in Syria but considers 2011 an important year in both cases. From page 50 to 57, Phillips comments on uprising. He explicates two main pre-emptive modes of appeasement adopted by the Assad regime to keep Syrians in general away from toppling it through any uprising be it in the name of the Arab Spring, unlike Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The first mode is contingent on five buy-ins such as offering economic benefits to the Sunni merchant and middle class, extending patronage to important tribes, launching propaganda to depict Bashar al-Assad a reformer, avowing secularism of the regime to offer solace to secular Sunnis against Islamism and Jihadism and keeping Sunni-Alawi (Shia) tensions lower, and resorting to the appeal of stability be valued by the masses. The second mode is resorting to two coup-proofing strategies such as avoiding army’s defection by buying its loyalty and resorting to spying (or “Mukhabarat” which were 15 agencies by 2011) on the regime, general population and each other. Moreover, the Assad regime has protected itself not only by resorting to selective – and not wide-spread – violence against protestors through the security forces and Alawi pro-Assad non-state actors such as Shabiha but also by following a reconciliatory policy towards Kurds.The Assad regime has come into the grip of two major limitations. First, the UNSC Resolution 1973 which, on March 17, 2011, gave mandate to NATO to “intervene to protect anti-regime demonstrators that Gaddafi had threatened to crush” deters Assad from using brute force against protestors – to avoid any international intervention, as mentioned on page 56. Secondly, the caution given to Syria by US President Barack Obama on August 20, 2012, not to cross the red line of using chemical weapons against rebels closes the option of suppressing rebels, as mentioned on page 175. Hence, whereas the measures taken by the Assad regime has enabled it to survive the uprising, the limitations imposed from outside have made it surrender Syria to a civil war.On page 196, Phillips writes: “Seeing advantage when the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war [by December 2011] … It eventually acquired sufficient supporters and territory inside Syria to rename itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013”. This paragraph shows that December 2011 was the time when Syria was descending into a civil war while the US forces were withdrawing from Iraq as per the 2008 electoral pledge made by US President Barack Obama. This is the point in time which Phillips considers to have given an impression of perceived decline of US power in the Middle East and which consequently shapes a new geopolitical order in the region. Here, Phillips forgets to mention the significance of the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the US signed in 2008 and expired on December 31, 2011, and which the government of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to extend owing to domestic political opposition. The extension could have afforded the US some leeway to station a residual (combat) force in Iraq to counter any immediate threat, as the US and NATO signed similar agreements with Afghanistan in December 2014 for another ten years.If the Eisenhower doctrine (January 05, 1957) and the Carter doctrine (January 23, 1980) were any guide, the assumption of post-American Middle East would be a fallacy. Similarly, if the Clinton doctrine (February 26, 1999) were any guide, US planes would soon be hitting targets in the troubled spots in Syria. Neither is there any dwindling of US influence in the Middle East nor is there any new Middle East in the making. Nevertheless, the Afghanistan model can still be created in Syria by persuading the Assad regime to introduce reforms to make the government as representative as possible to let pro-democratic Syrians back the democratic process. The Syrian rebels of all hues can be treated as the Taliban and al-Qaeda are dealt with in Afghanistan.

I had wanted to buy The Battle for Syria by Christopher Phillips for a long time, and I’m so glad I finally did. Phillips provides an incredibly detailed and balanced account of the Syrian Civil War, tracing its origins, the complex international involvement, and its devastating consequences. His writing is both accessible and thorough, making a difficult subject clearer without sacrificing depth.One of the highlights for me is the powerful conclusion, where Phillips describes the conflict as “the war that everyone lost.” This phrase perfectly encapsulates the tragedy and futility of the war, showing how no party truly came out victorious, whether it be the Syrian government, rebels, or foreign powers. It’s a sobering reflection that stayed with me long after finishing the book.If you want a comprehensive understanding of the Syrian conflict, this is the book to get.

I read the revised and updated version of this book published in 2020. This is clearly a work of prodigious research and scholarship and must surely be the standard work on this topic for years to come. I feel the level of detail may be overwhelming for the general reader wanting a brief overview of the Syrian civil war. The author has clearly written this work for the serious academic or scholar wanting to be fully informed.The author traces the progress of the conflict from civil demonstrations to armed insurrection and full scale civil war and charts the changing roles of outside players who almost invariably exacerbated the strife. The conflict was made worse by the immediate call for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad by the US, UK, France and Sunni Arabic states including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The conflict morphed into armed insurrection following the flow of arms and money to the rebels from the Arab countries. The expectation of support for the rebels from the United States following belligerent rhetoric from President Barack Obama only served to fuel the conflict and later to lead to widespread disenchantment with the role of the United States when such support did not arrive.The Syrian government was from the beginning supported by Iran as Syria provided an essential overland route to provide support to Iranian proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. In time this support became substantial with the role of Qassem Suleimani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Hezbollah taking active part in the war. Further decisive support was provided by Russia when President Putin ordered fighter planes to the much expanded base at Tartous from which numerous bombing missions were flown against the rebels.The foregoing ignores the rise and fall of numerous radical Islamic forces throughout the conflict including ISIS and the creation of the ‘Caliphate’ based on Raqqa, the consequences of which are still with the world today. The role of the US and Kurdish forces is expertly explained in the book.With President Bashar al-Assad still in place the author Christopher Phillips reviews the winners and losers of the conflict with perhaps the decline of US hegemony in the region being one of the biggest changes.This is a vastly informative but quite difficult book and requires considerable perseverance from the reader.

Avevo bisogno di conoscere la guerra civile siriana, partendo da zero. Questo testo mi ha aiutato nell'intento: è sicuramente lungo ma è accurato nei fatti e non lascia nulla in sospeso, narrando i fatti in maniera cronologica. Lo consiglio per una lettura imparziale, completa e aggiornata.

A well written account of all the external players and factors that lead to the disaster we see unfolding in Syria today. I have family in Syria and throughout the middle east, and his account of what happened seems to wring true with their on the ground witness of what took place before and during the war. Its refreshing to see an element of dimension this conflict truly deserves. Most books written by westerners are simple and childish in their depictions of the actors. Often coming across as severely biased or at best written from the perspective of a person whose only information seems to be "western media" sources. Great thanks goes out to the author for this book.in response to the review below, there was no opinion given to who benefits or who doesn't, and if so it's cleary objectional by the author. the purpose of the book was is a detailed account of all the belligerents and their actions before and during the war. For example you come away realizing that Iran is not pleased with the war and the actions the Assad Regime have imposed on them. A very interesting view point and one that is lacking in western media sources, that likes to portray Iran as the instigator, if not, the enabler of the war.For anyone looking to understand the international dynamics of the Syrians civil war, this book is definitely a must read.

I heavily relied on this book for several academic articles. It really gives a comprehensive understanding of the international involvement in Syria. The reader can tackle the different and conflicting interests and positions of the regional and international actors for a clearer understanding of the crisis and the potential scenarios in the future. recommended.