Full description not available
J**.
Courageous crew pays for brass-hat incompetence
It's perfectly clear to me, having read Jack Cheevers' well-researched and well-written book, that much of what went on regarding the U.S.S. Pueblo was never revealed to the world--until now. A debt of gratitude is owed the author by all of us, for without his book we'd remain greatly misinformed about a tragedy which could and should have been prevented.Anyone who is even remotely interested in imprisonment, intelligence gathering, the Korean Peninsula, military culture, naval activity, politics, post-traumatic stress, psychology, the Second Indochina War, or torture should read this book. Obviously, those interested in the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo and the fate of its crew will find this book enlightening.While not wanting to give anything away, as it's all of a piece, I'll nevertheless address a subject about which I've retained some small knowledge: destruction of classified documents and equipment. Imminent capture of such items by a hostile force was, during the period examined in this book, a scenario not taken seriously by relevant authority. The U.S.S. Pueblo's crew had neither the means nor the training necessary to destroy classified machines and materials on a moment's notice, as the ship captain's repeated requests for proper destruction equipment had been denied.In short, the "blue water" navy and its admirals had little respect for crews and ships embarked on intelligence-gathering missions. (This nonchalant attitude, however, did not prevail within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.) Shocking as such high-level incompetence is, it's equally shocking to learn of treatment accorded some of the U.S.S. Pueblo's crew upon their release from captivity.The sole fatality aboard U.S.S. Pueblo was Damage Controlman Third Class Duane Daniel Hodges (1946-1968) from Creswell in Oregon. May he and Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher (1927-2004) rest in peace, along with their 18 shipmates who have also passed away.
R**F
The Pueblo outlines a failure of Nerve
I was on active duty when this attack took place. I fully expected a campaign to convince the PRK to back down by informing them that we would destroy military facilities on a one for one basis if any of our Sailors were tortured or killed.I was appalled when we waited and waited to act. I was horrified when the decision was made to trust in negotiations with the PRK. I was completely outraged when our jets and attack aircraft were not launched against Wonson harbor thirty minutes after the last man crossed the bridge to freedom.The leadership of the Naval and National intelligence communities was abysmal. Divided authority with both NSA and CNO tasking the vessel without regard to its suitability nor the history of contacts with the PRK. The failure to have a rational limit on embarked classified material and equipment showed the fallacy of sending partially trained personnel who had to rely on the product of previous intelligence forays to be able to advise the skipper of the ship showed up horribly. To have a brand new vessel (in terms of mission) set out in a vessel without armament was hubris. Relying on Freedom of the seas practices instead of dedicated backup forces was failure at the CNO, CINPAC, and each lower level. Was there no one higher in rank and authority than the skipper of the Pueblo who thought about "What if?"Many of these questions were asked in this book. Few answers were made by the people who failed. The Court of inquiry was a farce and reminded me of the Court Martial of Gen Billy Mitchell. The only difference was we didn't have to wait 15 years to see who was right.A good book, although it could become tedious in places as the author tried to delineate the extent of damage done to our country. It also made the failure of background re-investigations to ferret out the Walkers all the more egregious.
P**D
The Rest of the Story
I was the medical officer on the USS POCONO AGC-16 a US NAVY ship out of Norfolk, VA in 1968. In late January 1968 we were homeward bound from the Caribbean when the teletype spit out the on-going saga of the USS Pueblo as it was happening. Our skipper - a hard-nosed mustang four-striper, WW II Veteran- proclaimed: "This is the first time in 150 years that a foreign power has taken a US NAVY ship. A skipper NEVER surrenders his ship. NEVER! Hell, They have a 50 Cal forward; I would have taken a few of those bastards with me!"My skipper's opinion was the prevailing view of most sea-going Naval officers at that time: "Don't give up the ship!" Better a suicidal defense with scuttling of the ship than surrender. Among most US NAVY officers at the time, Pueblo's Captain, Commander Bucher was considered a coward - pure and simple. Actually it wasn't so simple."Act of War..." puts a new light on the PUEBLO incident. Military cost cutting directives, for any operation not absolutely tied to the Vietnam War, resulted in the PUEBLO being inexcusably ill equipped for its mission; which was to spy on a well armed, belligerent North Korea. In retrospect, the outcome was predictable: capture of the poorly armed Pueblo by heavily armed warships, imprisonment of the Captain and crew in a brutal prison, torture, propaganda and eventually embarrassment for the USA. in this light Bucher's leadership is extraordinary and the crew's courage commendable. Considering their ordeal it is readily apparent that Bucher and his crew were not cowards. Nonetheless, when the crew was finally freed, Naval Brass subjected them to an inquest and threatened Courts-Marshall.As an ex-NAVY officer, this well researched book answered many questions that had bothered me for years. I highly recommend it.
Trustpilot
1 week ago
1 month ago