Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace

In this new study about one of the best-known and much-studied periods of history,Dominic Lieven has finally offered us a beautifully-crafted history written from the Russian point of view.It looks like he has combed every possible Russian archive and the result is mesmerizing.In 1812 Napoleon's army proudly marched and invaded Russia,but only less than two years later,the Russian army was marching into Paris.As the author points out from the very beginning,the personal history of Napoleon during these years,1812-1814,is a "tale of hubris and nemesis".The story contains two of the major battles in European history,Leipzig and Borodino.If at first Napoleon's first army was smashed in the battlefield of Russia, his second was defeated on the battlefields of Germany.To quote,"In the longest campaign in European history,the Russian army pursued the French all the way from Moscow to Paris and led the victorious coalition into the enemy capital on March 21,1814".Prof.Lieven adds that he is an old-fashioned- historian who has always wanted to tell this story and came to the conclusion that the "story as told in Western Europe and North America was very far from the truth".Thus he set out to correct things and decided that the best way to do it was to write about this era from the Russian perpective.We are also told that three of his direct ancestors were generals in the Battle of Leipzig! The Napoleonic wars occurred at the dawn of modern nationalism and the result is a national bias in the writing of history which exists in all countries especially when it comes to writing about war.One area of Napoleonic warfare which has attracted too little attention from historians of every nationality is that of logistics,namely the equipment and feeding of armies.One of the key triumphs of the Russian effort was its success in feeding and supplying more than half a million troops outside Russia's borders in 1813-1814.Another factor which is discussed in the book is one greatest hero of the war effort.This was not a human being but an animal:the horse.The horse fulfilled the present-day functions of the tank,the lorry,the aeroplane and motorized artillery."It was the weapon of shock,pursuit,reconnaissance, transport and mobile firepower"(p.7).Napoleon lost almost all the horses with which he invaded Russia.In 1813 he managed to replace the men but finding new horses proved a far more difficult and in the end disastrous problem.It was the lack of cavalry wgich stopped him from winning decisevely in the spring of 1813 campaign and persuaded him to agree to the fatal two-month summer armistice,which contributed so much to his ultimate defeat.The study of the Russian horse industry is discussed here for the first time and is the key part of the present book.How and why Russia overcame the enormous challenge presented by Napoleon is another main feature of this book.Military operations,strategy and diplomacy constitute the core of the book and the basic approach of it is chronological.The author starts with the negotiations at Tilsit 1807 and then commences with the Franco-Russian deal to run Europe until Napoleon's invasion of Russia.In the summer of 1810 the Russians, who were far from trusting Napoleon,sent a number of young and competent officers to Germany in order to gather intelligence.The reasons for this were the words spoken by the French minister of war who boasted that Napoleon's army had never been so well equipped.The next chapter gives a very long and informative description of Russia's generals and minister of war Aleksei Arakcheev.There are four chapters devoted to 1812 and Borodino and four more chapters on 1813 while the year 1815 gets two chapters.Prof.Lieven discusses in detail the main differences between the two armies.If the Russian army under Alexander the First and Kutuzov was deeply religious and imbued with patriotic themes,the French adversary wassecular and never spoke about patriotism.There was also a partisan warfare in 1812 and the reader is informed that this movement was not the same as the partisan one during the Nazi occupation in 1941-1945.Another myth dispelled here in the best possible convincing way has to do with the Russian winter-the factor which was regarded so far as responsible for Napoleon's defeat.This was not true and is nonsense, because it was only in December,after the French army had already been destroyed, that the winter became unusually and "ferociously cold"(p.265).However,not only Napoleon's troops suffered tremendous losses.Kutuzov reported to Alexander in December 1812 that the army's losses had been so enormous that he was obliged to hide them not just from the enemy but also from his own officers.A new enemy was at the gates of Russia at the end of 1812:typhus.The disease was rampant among the prisoners of war whom the Russians were capturing in droves and it spread quickly.The main factor which contributed to Napoleon's defeat in 1812-1814 concerns the Russian soldier and officer.The Russian army showed great heroism and suffered immensely in 1812,and the year after the Russian army fought with more skill because of the experience it had gained in 1812.The Russians were skilled and intelligent enough in order to arrive at the conclusion that to remove the enemy threat required taking the war beyond thecountry's borders.This was to achieved by recruiting allies.The kudos goes to Alexander, who managed to grab his allies by the scruff of the neck in order to get them to serve their own and Europe's interests.Russian and European security depended on each other.Napoleon's final chance and hope to be the master of Europe by controlling Germany were dashed by the mistakes he and his generals made on the battelfield of Leipzig.Though the allies lost 52000 men at this battle,they fought with more courage and tenacity than their counterparts.Napoleon got back to the Rheine with 85000 men but thousands of them succumbed ,again,to typhus.How Russia's home front was mobilized against the enemy is discussed in detail.The book also contains sixteen maps-some of them extremely detailed and informative.Although there are many details on each aspect of the Russo-French campaign,the reader never gets bored and has the feeling of actually being on the battlefielld or present during the relevant diplomatic talks. Fresh analysis and insights and a very good and intriguing narrative make this one of the best books written on this fascinating era.

Alexander I has had a bad reputation as an indecisive leader. This book will do a great deal to rehabilitate this tsar's reputation and will underscore the various strengths and weaknesses of the Russian empire to wage war.It is important to keep in mind that Alexander was constantly refining his position and determining what would yield the best results. He was a different person in 1805, 1812, and in 1814 as was the Russian Army a different entity as well in all of those years.The 1805 campaign was a shock to the system of the Russian empire. To face defeat at Austerlitz and the subsequent increase of ties between Russia and France did a great deal to provoke action.As is the case with Russia (then, during the Soviet period and now), this followed with certain bureaucratic constraints. History has shown that it is very much a function of the leader (be he Tsar, General Secretary or something else) and his ability to pick the right individuals to deal with specific tasks all of which fall within his sphere of coordination. The autocrat proposes and the bureaucracy implements.Alexander emerges as nothing so much as a juggler of personnel as the Russian empire sought to prepare for the next struggle between 1805-1812. Lieven has masterful command of Russian intelligence work in Paris, the development of key means of waging war, and also the development of strategy and tactics during the period.The importance of logistics is another matter that has an impact on all aspects of warfare and any person who thinks that the issues associated with logistics can be ignored soon finds himself defeated. This was a major consideration throughout Lieven's narrative. For instance it is a requirement to protect the armaments factories at Tula that informs Kutuzov's decision to allow Moscow to be taken. Large cities can always be replaced with time, armaments factories are more precious than gold during wartime.Lieven makes no secret of his agenda at the beginning of the book. He is seeking to show just how Russia defeated Napoleon. In demonstrating this process he sets himself against both Tolstoy and Clauswitz on occasion. Lieven shows that it was not just a matter of cold and mud and weather that defeated Napoleon, there was considerable planning before the war that enabled the Russian Army to begin 1812 at Vilna, retreat to Moscow as the French advanced and then to follow the French all the way to Paris in 1814. This does not diminish "War and Peace," the greatest of all Russian novels, as much as it enhances the estimation of the Russian military elite. Shakespeare's history plays are matchless, but poor as representations of actual events.The story of Russia's defeat of Napoleon can be broken down into several key battles and campaigns. The first is the battle for Russia which includes the battles of Smolensk, Borodino, and finally Berezina. The two crucial factors (which was understood before the invasion) were light calvary and artillery. Here the Russians were fortunate in the first (which included the cossack regiments) and challenged, but ultimately successful in the last.1813 was about the battle for Germany and was highlighted by the battle of Leipzig, which shattered the notion of Napoleon's invincibility. Driving Napoleon from Poland and Germany also had a negative impact on his ability to restock his supply of horses. Given the necessity of horses in this age of light cavalry this was to have a huge impact on the future of the war.1814 was the battle of France and this probably was the time of greatest uncertainty in terms of the diplomatic and political objectives, While it appears to be a foregone conclusion that the Bourbons would be replaced on the throne, this, as Lieven demonstrates, was a more complex and fluid situation than one might imagine.I think that the only flaw in this book is that Lieven does not really address just how the inclusion of the Baltic nobility, whose role in defeating Napoleon is important to his narrative, was viewed by the traditional nobility during Catherine the Great. The fact that Catherine sought to put them on an equal footing was something that was somewhat unpopular is probably something that continues to affect the way historians, both Russian and others, have looked upon their contribution. This is a minor point, however.Lieven's exploration of the details of conflict is probably one of the best works on the Napoleonic period since David Chandler's definitive studies of the French side. His tireless exploration of archival material does a great deal to change perceptions of the conflict. This is period rich in personalities whose impact continued on beyond just the period of the wars, some maintained positions of responsibility for the subsequent 30-40 year period. This is an excellent book which should interest anyone who takes an interest in the Napoleonic period and the Russian military.

Put the war into prospective!

The title and the cover would initially suggest that this is yet again just another book about Napoleon Bonaparte’s 1812 invasion of Russia and therefore may well be one to take a pass on. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, to take a pass on this book would probably mean you were giving up a history taken from sources not often tapped by western writers and you would also be leaving a hole in your Napoleonic literature. For Dominic Lieven, an Englishman of Russian heritage has drilled into those files, documents and archives held in Moscow & St.Petersburg and delivered a fine work that not only covers more than 1812 (1805-1814 actually) but has us entrenched on the Russian side of the fence and allows the reader to look more closely at the actions, decisions and relationships of the Russian players of the time. Not only has Lieven had to go further than the oft used western sources, but even when using Russian ones, he has had to cut through the decades of communist political changes to the history too.The book covers many subjects, but in the main, moves along in chronological order, sometimes breaking that rule when chapters cover a broader subject. So for instance, the rebuild, reorganisation and cogent system being put in place about recruiting covers a few years span.The book also details much of the internal politics and individual thoughts of the main Russian players. I’d say that as an administrator and planner, Bagration comes out very well. He was the one that seems to have really picked up the ball and ran with it when it came to getting the mess that was 1805 and sorting it out into a better machine by 1812. Though helped by a predecessor's work, he made good on where he picked it up. It was he too that seems to have devised the retreat-no battle mantra before Napoleon’s invasion (after being too late with his advance to Poland idea) and this in general, albeit with some wavering was supported and stood-by by Tsar Aleksandr. Kutusov as we know is generally credited with it all and to a large extent, it was his refusal to turn and battle the French that meant that the plan was kept to. But here, we are informed that it was not actually his innovation. This has some roots from the communist years when it was perhaps not so ‘cool’ to associate anything too useful with the royal family.Hearing about the Russian finances is interesting. How did they fund such a massive war that took them from the brink of being overrun and defeated, to keeping a full sized army that marched through Poland, Germany, across the Rhine and eventually into Paris? Whilst they did have to dig deep themselves into man-power and supplies, it is interesting to read how brutal on Polish taxation and commandeering they were. They also relied on Prussian food and money as payment for the 1813 efforts. Despite this, it was no sure thing that Russia would even march all the way into France. There were various schools of thought that swung between a complete crushing of Napoleon, to allowing him to keep the confederation, or keeping the old French boundaries. Much of the debate was due to how Russia needed their ‘allies’ affected. Britain needed a strong France to keep them in check for example. Austria and Germany needed a France on their border. Russia needed a freer hand in the Balkans or the east…. And so on it went. In the end, the fact that there could be no real peace until Napoleon had gone won out in the end.I suspect Lieven had an even bigger book initially but was probably asked to clip it somewhat. For me, the 1814 campaign is whizzed through and there are some strange choices for featured battle write ups. Obviously Borodino gets its share, but Leipzig is given a good first day, but is then rushed through for the next few. Even the flight from Leipzig by the French is very lightly touched IMO. And whilst we get a very short mention of Lutzen and Bautzen. Katzbach and Kulm get full detailed write-ups.In the end though, Lieven has completed a lively, informative and thought-provoking study of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars. All the behind the scenes debates and quandaries between the Russian nobles, generals and Tsar. The decisions taken, reforms made and money made available. Without doubt, the book leads the reader to reconsider just how instrumental they were in Napoleon’s defeat. Destroying the Grand Armee in 1812. Taking the fight into Prussia and supporting the German state (and being supported themselves of course) and again, defeating another Grand Armee all in 1813. Then the winter’s campaign of 1814 into France itself, driving the nail into the Napoleonic coffin and the triumphant entry into Paris.So an excellent book and one that has to be highly recommended. I gave 4 stars rather than 5 because I do feel that in some areas it had been cropped to fit into a number of pre-set pages. I'm pretty sure Dominic had more to impart in this overall history. He'll have to write a book or two solely dedicated to individual subjects contained within this broad history.

This is an excellent historical account of the wars with Napoleon before his first exile to Elba. In other words the main and real war with Napoleon fought by the Russians. We have tendency in the English speaking world to only think of Waterloo and not realise that Napoleon was a broken beaten man by then. This book explains very well why he was broken and beaten by the time he came to Waterloo. For any scholar of this period this is a fantastic book and very well written and engaging. I really enjoyed itIf this review was helpful please click the yes button

This is really interesting as there must be 100 books from the European side to one from the Russians. A great read and just in case we forget, the Russian beat Napoleon (and Hitler) and they did the dying - for us

Excellent step by step and year by year review about the relations of Imperial Russia with Napoleon and the campagins 1807-1814. Crystal clear narrative, with detailed explanations of the why and how of Russian (and French) strategies and actions, the highlights / lessons learned were, for me, that Russia waged victoriously many wars during these years (Turkey, Sweden...) and never accepted any French operational superiority, and that Emperor Alexander's decision of continuing "up to Paris" after the Russian campaign of 1812 galvanized -and allowed- Europe to first resist and then defeat Napoleon's ambition. I probably can better explain my opinion about this book by sharing that I have bougth four of these books and given them as gifts to friends. Highly recommended.