Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia (Adelphi series)

When protest and then war broke out in 2013/14 in Ukraine, many people in the US couldn't find Ukraine, much less the Crimea or the Donbass, on a map, and for most people that's probably still the case. Even the experts seemed and seem to be baffled by what is going on over there and why the situation won't resolve.Except that it's not really that complicated. As Charap and Colton discuss here, the current crisis in Ukraine has been inevitably in the making for over 25 years, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union.Actually, it's been in the making much longer than that. The close yet uneasy relationship between Russia and Ukraine dates back a millennium, to the age of Rus', the medieval collection of principalities that spawned both modern countries. Then there was the Soviet period, but perhaps the less said about that the better, other than to note Khrushchev's decision to gift the Crimea to (the) Ukraine, despite its 100+ years as specifically Russian territory, something that came back to haunt both countries once they became separate political entities.But the present problems arose as a result of what Charap and Colton describe as "zero-sum" policies pursued by all sides, which has resulted in, as the authors note, everyone being worse off. The authors trace the past 25 years of miscommunication and increasingly entrenched positions on both the Russian and the US/EU/NATO sides, with Ukraine caught in the middle and all too willing to play the great powers off against each other.For Western readers who follow the issue, Russia's truculence will come as no surprise. But for many readers, the book's dissection of the missteps, lack of vision, and sheer arrogance on the US/EU/NATO side will probably be enlightening. The misunderstandings and the fraught issue of what would happen to NATO following the collapse of the USSR, the fact that the West often appeared to be, and in many cases was, hypocritical or even overtly deceptive, and the shaky situation of the post-Color Revolution post-Soviet space, in which the vaunted (in the West) peaceful regime changes led not to reform, but to even more corruption and infighting, have all formed a perfect storm to create the frozen conflict in the Donbass, now in its fourth year.It's a bold move to put out a book on a current conflict, because things could have changed dramatically by the time the book reaches the world, but in this case Charap and Colton's pessimistic assessment that things are unlikely to improve soon has thus far been proven correct. Regular skirmishes continue to mar the non-peace of the Donbass, while Kyiv covers itself in less and less glory, picking fights with former heroes Saakashvili and Savchenko and spiraling into further and further disfunction, as Moscow, Washington, and Berlin posture and rattle their sabres.Is there a way out of this? The authors would like to think so, but hold out little hope. As they conclude:"The uncomfortable truth is that today neither Russia nor the West believes that the other would be willing to accept a compromise. Those who rule Russia are convinced that the West will forever push to extend its reach right up to Russia's borders, and even inside them. Many Western policymakers are convinced that Russia for its part is a predator state, absolutely committed to domination of its neighbors."Sadly, neither of these threat perceptions is completely baseless. Those who hold them can rightly point to numerous reasons why the talks we propose might fail. But the frightening consequences fo a lengthy confrontation more than justify an attempt to find agreement. Not making such an attempt--and thus ensuring a new cold war--would be the height of policy negligence. One cold war was enough.""Everyone Loses" is a thoroughly researched book, but still short and easily read by those who want to know more about the current situation in Ukraine and especially the Donbass, and know that what's being printed in the papers isn't the full story. A thought-provoking and timely study of a critical issue, well worth reading by academics and non-academics alike.

Good concrete analysis of the crisis. One of the few books who tried to present the russian perspective without downplaying or using stereotypes from the Soviet Era.

Gave a great explanation about what plagues current Western/Russian relations and how that leads to crises such as in Crimea, with brief mentions of Syria as well.A fantastic and easy to follow read.

Given the photo on the cover of the Sergei Prokofiev International Airport in Eastern Ukraine in ruins, I was expecting a different book. The book provides an excellent explanation of the event leading up to the Maidan Revolution, but not enough (for me anyway) of the important events fallowing Maidan. The book has a superb chronology of events, but only an okay map of Ukraine.My four star rating is valid for people who are searching for a good book on the reasons for Maidan.

Insightful analysis

Superficial and Unrealistic!As someone who has read numerous books on the crisis in Ukraine, I had high hopes for this book’s claim to offer an even handed analysis of the situation and a way out of it. I got neither. The author’s efforts to point equal blame at both the West and Russia, are lovely, but they have very little to do with the underlying dynamics of what happened in the past and what is going on today.As Angela Stent of Georgetown University outlines in her 2015, ‘’The Limits of Partnership,’’ (2015), the West and Russia have profoundly different interests and values and are naturally in competition with each other. With the fall of the USSR a power vacuum opened up in Eastern Europe and it was inevitable that both sides would clash there. In addition, a number of serious efforts were made by the West to fit Russia into the existing post war European security order, but it simply didn’t fit. Its expectations were too high, and its own values and norms impossible to integrate into the existing system.Of course if we lived in some perfect world, there might have been a possibility to alter this, but the costs for the West in terms of its own values and politics would have been too high. This is even more so the case today, with Russia’s aggression and lawlessness on the international scene. Trying to once again push the reset button with Putin’s recalcitrant and revanchist Russia can only hurt the West and what is left of the existing world order. Its sad to say it, but it is Russia that will have to change its policies and attitudes in its ‘’Near Abroad, for progress to be made, and the experts predict that this will quickly occur once Putin leaves office. Patience and firmness on the West’s part will be its best path in the interim.I was also put off by some of the terminology used by Colton and Charap, especially the expression ‘’In-Between States,’’ to describe the six former Russian republics. To use such jargon, implies that these states exist only in terms of the Great Powers that surround them, belittling them and their efforts to escape the clutches of Russia. The agency of these smaller states is as critical to the solution of the ongoing crisis as any of the great players in the region. Certainly, it has been Eastern European country’s like Poland and Sweden who have lead the charge in bringing Ukraine into the European fold. They well know what kind of Russia they are dealing with and where lies the real problem for stability in the region.The last straw for me however, was the author’s careless use of the expression ‘’playbook’’ to substantiate the Russian invasion of Crimea. They seem to imply by this that the Russians had used up every other possible means of diplomacy and coercion to influence Ukraine, and were now naturally lead to the use of force. Where is the legitimacy or logic in this??? As a number of academic commentators have stated about this book, it seems that Colton and Charap have only a cursory knowledge of the complexity of Ukraine, and like so many other ‘’Russian experts,’’ have simply jumped on the Ukraine market.Finally, I have been really surprised by all the positive remarks that this book has received from a large part of the academic community. Besides its weak analysis and conclusions, I did not find any new facts in the book that have not been previously noted in numerous other accounts. Both Gerald Toal’s ‘’Near Abroad’’ (2015) and Rajan Menon’s ‘’Conflict in Ukraine,’’ (2015), take a somewhat similar tack and seem to me to be academically superior.You can also read critical online reviews of this book by Andrew Wilson, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Edward Lucas, and Taras Kuzio. I would also highly recommend Angela Stent’s book, ‘’The Limits to Partnership,’’ (2015), Bobo Lo’s excellent, ‘’Russia and the New World Disorder,’’ (2015), and the blog of Mark Galeotti, a leading expert on Eastern European defense issues.

Fabulous book, perhaps the best re Ukraine crisis. On second thought, can leave out the "perhaps." Thoughtful, sophisticated, detailed analysis. Notes numerous inflection points where something other than zero-sum thinking could have avoided the crisis. Urges US to take the lead in offering negotiations (although 3-way EU, Ukraine & Russia talks might be better way to go).

Superficial and UnrealisticAs someone who has read numerous books on the crisis in Ukraine, I had high hopes for this book’s claim to offer an even handed analysis of the situation and a way out of it. I got neither. The authors' efforts to point equal blame at both the West and Russia, are lovely, but they have very little to do with the underlying dynamics of what happened in the past and what is going on today.As Angela Stent of Georgetown University outlines in her 2015, ‘’The Limits of Partnership,’’ (2015), the West and Russia have profoundly different interests and values and are naturally in competition with each other. With the fall of the USSR a power vacuum opened up in Eastern Europe and it was inevitable that both sides would clash there. In addition, a number of serious efforts were made by the West to fit Russia into the existing post war European security order, but it simply didn’t fit. Its expectations were too high, and its own values and norms impossible to integrate into the existing system.Of course if we lived in some perfect world, there might have been a possibility to alter this, but the costs for the West in terms of its own values and politics would have been too high. This is even more so the case today, with Russia’s aggression and lawlessness on the international scene. Trying to once again push the reset button with Putin’s recalcitrant and revanchist Russia can only hurt the West and what is left of the existing world order. Its sad to say it, but it is Russia that will have to change its policies and attitudes in its ‘’Near Abroad, for progress to be made, and the experts predict that this will quickly occur once Putin leaves office. Patience and firmness on the West’s part will be its best path in the interim.I was also put off by some of the terminology used by Colton and Charap, especially the expression ‘’In-Between States,’’ to describe the six former Russian republics. To use such jargon, implies that these states exist only in terms of the Great Powers that surround them, belittling them and their efforts to escape the clutches of Russia. The agency of these smaller states is as critical to the solution of the ongoing crisis as any of the great players in the region. Certainly, it has been Eastern European country’s like Poland and Sweden who have lead the charge in bringing Ukraine into the European fold. They well know what kind of Russia they are dealing with and where lies the real problem for stability in the region.The last straw for me however, was the author’s careless use of the expression ‘’playbook’’ to substantiate the Russian invasion of Crimea. They seem to imply by this that the Russians had used up every other possible means of diplomacy and coercion to influence Ukraine, and were now naturally lead to the use of force. Where is the legitimacy or logic in this??? As a number of academic commentators have stated about this book, it seems that Colton and Charap have only a cursory knowledge of the complexity of Ukraine, and like so many other ‘’Russian experts,’’ have simply jumped on the Ukraine market.Finally, I have been really surprised by all the positive remarks that this book has received from a large part of the academic community. Besides its weak analysis and conclusions, I did not find any new facts in the book that have not been previously noted in numerous other accounts. Both Gerald Toal’s ‘’Near Abroad’’ (2015) and Rajan Menon’s ‘’Conflict in Ukraine,’’ (2015), take a somewhat similar tack and seem to me to be academically superior. I would highly recommend reading Angela Stent’s book, ‘’The Limits to Partnership,’’ (2015), and Bobo Lo’s excellent, ‘’Russia and the New World Disorder’’ (2015). One can also pick up the blog of Mark Galeotti, an expert on Eastern European defense issues.

Yes, this book is a thoughtful analysis of a lose-lose-situation for Europe, the in-between countries (e.g. Ukraine) and Russia. All sides have made some horrible mistakes coupled with dangerous assumptions about their spheres of influence. Everyone interesting in compromises and peace should read this book.

Very informative and probably the most objective book on the topic!