Cambridge University Press Five Times Faster: Rethinking the Science, Economics, and Diplomacy of Climate Change

I've tracked climate science, policy and economics for over four decades. I have expertise. Having studied and worked as a geochemist, ecologist, and environmental economist, I've been frustrated by what is not being said (e.g., the historical chemical record suggests strongly that we are going to get hotter/dryer/wetter much faster). Here is an author who says it. Well-written and well argued, Simon Sharpe provides keen analysis and argument that, frankly, lines up with what we really know. His explorations of the inherent limitations of modelling, from science to economics, the nonsensical conclusions and pollyannaish projections that parade around as 'truth', and the severe lack of courageous taking stock is urgently needed. As an advisor to political leadership, he is refreshingly realistic. His discussion of systemic frailty - social, economic, ecological - is a much-needed cold shower. And his challenge to the lack of collective imagination is equally sobering. If you want to get underneath the narratives and explore a cultural critique as to why more action is needed faster, this book will take you there. Also, to note, I really appreciated the book's structure. Sharpe offers useful GPS - 'we just discussed A, now we are going to explore B, and here is how they are connected.' This makes it possible to cover a lot of nuanced ground and keep up with a broad thinker who comes from the heart and has a lot to say.

Don’t waste money and time….. book is crap, full of spelling mistakes and poor articulation.

I found this book fascinating. It's great the way it gives an insight into the workings of government and international negotiations, and the role played in these by scientists and economists. I felt it gave an excellent overview of the topics as well as going into details. It creates a clear picture of why we haven't made enough progress yet on averting climate disaster. It shows how serious the risks are and reveals that politicians tend not to be aware of the extent of the danger.The author draws on his experience to suggest how we can approach the problems differently and get much faster change. He describes useful steps that are being taken, and how we can build on these.The book is written in a very readable way, and while the descriptions of the risks are sobering, the ideas for change are heartening.

This book is about climate change and how to handle it. Simon Sharpe is a UK civil servant who has spent 10 years working on climate change. He has now written an important book that’s been well and widely reviewed. He is an engaging speaker who can be heard via you-tube. Sharpe adopts a slogan on a sign carried by a 7-year old protester outside the UK Parliament: “We’ll stop protesting when you stop being so shit.” He writes: “This book is about why we are still being so shit about dealing with climate change.” (Page 3) Considering his long history of climate change diplomacy, this is quite courageous as well as alarming. His reasons, stated and argued in 300 pages, does not target the politicians as I would have expected, but blames the way scientific data is routinely presented by climate scientists (though Sharpe would never use that word ‘blame.’), and uses the whole mid-section of the book to criticize ‘Economics’ in nine chapters starting with “Worse than Useless.” The third part of the book is “Diplomacy,” starting with “A Foreseeable Failure,” which provides a sense of bleakness and the difference between expectations and results over ten tough years. And yet he makes the best of it and sets out a hopeful vision for the future, even though in the real world carbon emissions have grown steadily over the same time period and use of fossil fuels shows no signs of slowing down.His title “Five Times Faster” is justified by the claim that over twenty years, emissions have decreased by “a measly 1.5% per year,” but the magic number - as he puts it: “the just about safe and stable” number - must be 8%. He provides three sources for this statement, all of which I checked but was none the wiser. However, I can easily understand why ‘heads of state,’ indeed policy-makers generally, are baffled by the IPCC Reports, which are the major instruments by which climate scientists communicate with politicians. Each report is several thousand pages long, but are conveniently summarized in a 48-page 28,000 word “Summary for Policy Makers.” As policy makers are people too, I assumed that the Summary would be like what Jeremy Irons, playing the ultimate boss in the movie “Margin Call,” asked for: “Please, speak as you might to a young child, or a golden retriever…” But not a bit of it, and here is an example of what the scientists present to policy makers to guide them:“GHG emissions trends over 1990–2019 vary widely across regions and over time, and across different stages of development, as shown in Figure SPM.2. Average global per capita net anthropogenic GHG emissions increased from 7.7 to 7.8 tCO2-eq, ranging from 2.6 tCO2-eq to 19 tCO2-eq across regions. Least developed countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2-eq and 4.6 tCO2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO2-eq), excluding CO2-LULUCF.18 (high confidence) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure1.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, 2.2, Figure TS.4}”“Projected cumulative future CO2 emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure without additional abatement exceed the total cumulative net CO2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. They are approximately equal to total cumulative net CO2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%). (high confidence) {2.7, 3.3}”Sharpe criticizes this presentation of predictive data not on grounds of its incomprehensibility but because he thinks that policy makers want actual risk assessments not reams of data. Either way, it seems a vast disconnect exists between scientists and politicians. Sharpe is well aware and writes informatively of his ten years of trying to bridge that gap. The gross figures relating to greenhouse gas emissions are testament to that failure. Recently, the U.S. has been hit with devastating fires in Hawaii - we will rebuild, say the brave homeowners; but not insured by us, say the property insurers, who have all but withdrawn from Florida and may withdraw from Hawaii - flooding in the Nevada desert at the Burning Man festival, hurricanes in California, torrential storms and flooding in Florida, heat waves and fires in Canada, the list goes on all over the world. Sharpe says that politicians want to know about risk - what’s the worst that can happen? So that they can prepare, but they don’t get that from the climate scientists. He makes a convincing case.He also makes a convincing case about current (classical) economic theory, which in the interests of time and space I will not summarize. It’s worth reading and not too long. And there is a growing literature on the same subject. He mounts a trenchant criticism against William Nordhaus, scion of Harvard and Nobel-prize winner who considered that global warming of 3 degrees celsius should be considered quite acceptable by the turn of the century based on a cost-benefit analysis. Even though climate science consider a 3 degree rise would be catastrophic. Even today, we don’t much see estimates of what any given disaster is going to cost, like the Hawaii fires, perhaps because economists factor in the cost of rebuilding as a economic “good.” So a total loss of many people’s wealth is actually a boon under the theory of “creative destruction.”In his Epilogue, Sharpe accurately summarizes his 300-page book, emphasizing major points. He tells us that climate scientists have so far not developed “proper climate change risk assessments that make clear to heads of government the full extent of the threat.” He does not shrink from our predicament, and says avoiding dangerous climate change “might just conceivably be possible,” but concedes that “the inertia of the UN negotiations process “makes it ever more impenetrable to outsiders.” And also to insiders, it seems. He acknowledges we are in a desperate situation, but finally offers that change “may be difficult but is not impossible. We have done it before and can do it again.” To this end, which is nothing more or less than our survival, Sharpe has made this valuable contribution.

Half way through