The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution Paperback – March 27, 2012

The Origins of Political Order is not a light book but it is highly readable. Fukuyama surveys political evolution across the planet from our earliest days. The book is separated into 5 parts containing the dynamics of pre state society, early statehood in particular what would be considered our first civilizations, the rule of law, accountable government and the last section is an attempt to weave the previous four parts together to show how feedback loops can arise. I will try to give a quick overview.The author starts by posing the question of how does one get to the stage of a final state from pre-state society. The author introduces the theories of early man presented by Locke, Rousseau and Hegel. Man in a state of nature is then revisited empirically and shown to be quite different from these philosophical speculations. Early man is shown to be social (in and desiring recognition, seeking relative status) and reciprocating based on kin relations. The author maintains that political goals do not residualize to economic goals. This in a certain sense can be considered to originate from the game theory differences of relative status and economic cooperation. The author continues on from pre-state society to analyze China, India, early Islamic, Mamluk, Ottoman and Christian society. Each one is fascinating and one gets a sense of how different power structures evolved based on the distribution of power and the organization of beauracracy. In particular the author displays how paternalism within the state is a seed of political decay and that there is a constant struggle between rent seeking activity internally counterbalanced by the pressure from those for whom rent was being taken. In particular this issue is the source of political tension in a zero sum world. The author then takes on the idea of rule of law. The rule of law is introduced by way of showing the difficulty in establishing it. There is a vague parallel to the chicken and the egg, in that - for there to be rule of law there must be a state to provide that, but for there to be a state people must submit to the rule of law. Of course the auther goes through the history of the rule of law to describe how it can and did evolve. Our religious doctorines provide a template for universal laws for man, which helped form a basis for legal contract. The history of England's common law is reviewed. The rule of law in China is described, which historically was much more top down absolutist, but checked by the influence of the trained beauracracy. The author then gets to political accountability and how it evolved differently. Accountable government is described from the view of the balance of power between the parties which had it. When patrimonialism ruled in areas with slave labour, political accountability evolved very differently to where all were free and there were evolving middle class. Political accountability can be considered one of the final stages to a dynamic political order where stability is maintained through the participation of society in constructing the rule of law and government that they willingly submit to be governed by.The author concludes by tying it together. He notes that political progress and decay are both outcomes neither is inevitable and progress and decay evolve out of whether political order allows for progress or hinders it (when the economic means to evolve are there). He ties together how many foundations of political order are mutually reinforcing and how some are pre-requisits for stable society. There can be path depencies but history does not need to be re-lived to create a new modern state where there currently is none. At the same time given the time it takes to create an environment of trust and a competitive landscape that is meritocratic, to get to a modern state is extremely nuanced, cultural and difficult. There are many valuable insights one can glean from the Origins of Political Order and despite its length and depth, it is interesting the entire way through. The reader is left wanting to read the second volume on Political Order after the French Revolution.

Francis Fukuyama's book covers political development "from prehuman times to the French Revolution." The book is well researched, well written, and reasonably readable. The author certainly appears to have an amazing deep understanding of the subject matter.I found the book to be far more interesting as it progressed. Much of the information in the first two sections was new to me, so it was a bit more of a challenging read. I had more context when I read the last three section, so I found these sections to be more informative, more enlightening, and a more enjoyable read.The book is well-organized: the notes are extensive and provide additional information when warranted. What's more, the bibliography is excellent.

In 1968, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008) published his most important (though, alas, not his most well-known) book: "Political Order in Changing Societies". This book is still considered essential reading for students of comparative politics, especially those studying political development and modernization theory. In it, Huntington challenged the conventional wisdom of the day about how countries develop, and what developing countries need to do in order to modernize their political systems. I'm ashamed to admit that I haven't re-read Huntington's classic text since grad school; so my recollection of the specifics of his argument might be a bit fuzzy. But the main lesson I learned from "Political Order in Changing Societies" is that discussions of development and modernization tend to place too much emphasis on the importance of freedom and democracy, and too little emphasis on the importance of stability and good governance.For Huntington, whether a country is a capitalist democracy or a communist dictatorship is far less crucial than whether or not it has a government that is actually capable of governing -- i.e. maintaining law and order, insuring peace and security, and providing essential public goods and services. As he saw it, the problem with many countries in the developing world is not that they have the wrong system of government, but that they barely have any government at all. The first order of business for political development has to be building a state that is strong enough to govern, and stable enough to withstand political conflict, economic crisis, and social upheaval without collapsing. Once a strong, stable state is in place, the administration of that state needs to be professionalized and purged of corruption and cronyism. Only then should we worry about what specific form of government that state has. Perhaps the worst mistake we can make when dealing with developing countries is to prematurely push them towards holding free elections -- which are almost always destabilizing -- before they have even established basic political order within their societies. This is a recipe for chaos. (And, despite Huntington's warning, we are still making this same mistake today in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine.)In 2011, political scientist Francis Fukuyama, a former student, colleague, and friend of Samuel Huntington, published a new book dedicated to his late mentor. Fukuyama is best known for his 1992 book, "The End of History and the Last Man", which explored what the end of communism had to teach us about political development and the spread of liberal democracy. More recently, he has become a noted critic of neoconservatism, a political philosophy he had supported before the Iraq War, but which he abandoned once it became clear that the neoconservative foreign policy of the Bush administration was a complete disaster. But in his most recent book, Fukuyama returns to the topic of political development, giving an updated follow-up to Huntington's classic text on the subject.Fukuyama's goal in "The Origins of Political Order" is to lay the foundations for a theory of political development that is able to explain where political institutions come from, how they develop, which institutions are necessary for good governance, and why some countries have those institutions while others do not. As far as I'm concerned, Fukuyama achieves this goal quite admirably. This book is a worthy successor to "Political Order in Changing Societies", and should be required reading for students of comparative politics. In fact, I think Fukuyama has written the definitive text on political development. I'm not suggesting that political science students ought to stop reading Huntington -- his insights are still important -- but, in my opinion, Fukuyama's contributions to the field surpass those of his former teacher. This book should be incorporated into the standard political science curriculum as quickly as possible.So, what insights does Fukuyama bring to the study of political development? First, he argues (persuasively, in my opinion) that a society needs three very distinct things if it is to be well governed: First, a strong state. Second, the rule of law. And third, political accountability. As Huntington noted back in 1968, if a state can't govern the territory it is supposed to be sovereign over -- if it can't enforce laws, maintain order, settle disputes, defend the borders, put down attempted coups and insurrections, collect taxes, provide public goods and services, manage public works projects, etc. -- it doesn't really matter whether it is democratic or authoritarian: it will be unable to protect and serve its citizens, leaving them vulnerable to violence, deprivation, and exploitation. Contrary to anarchist and libertarian fantasies, keeping the government weak will not safeguard the freedom of ordinary citizens. In fact, quite the opposite. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the "state of nature" abhors a power vacuum. If government officials aren't able to exercise control over a given territory, then someone else -- warlords, strongmen, street gangs, organized crime bosses, business interests, landowners, religious authorities, demagogues, factional leaders, tribal elders, local bigwigs, etc. -- certainly will; and they will do so in a way that advances their own parochial interests with little regard for the rights, liberties, or welfare of anyone outside their own favored in-group. So, the first thing a society needs in order to insure the wellbeing of its citizens is a strong state that is actually capable of exercising sovereign political power throughout a given territory.But if a society has a strong state, what's to prevent that state from abusing its power and oppressing the people? That's where the other two requisites for good governance come in: the rule of law and political accountability. Without these two things, there's little to prevent a powerful state from becoming an abusive state. The rule of law means that the state can't simply exercise its power arbitrarily, but has to do everything in accordance with certain established rules and procedures. This places a much-needed check on the power of the state without leaving it too weak to govern. In modern times, the rule of law often takes the form of a (written or unwritten) constitution, and an independent judiciary with at least some power of judicial review. In pre-modern times, it often took the form of an organized religion with the self-proclaimed authority to speak on behalf of a power higher than the state, which upheld a body of sacred laws that even kings were obliged to obey. But, regardless of how the rule of law gets implemented in any particular society at any given point in time, the fundamental principle behind it is the same: The government is not above the law.But the rule of law, by itself, might not be sufficient to insure that a strong state doesn't abuse its power. One additional thing is needed: political accountability. In other words, the government, and those entrusted to run it, must be held to account for how the power of the state is used. Abuses of power must be punished. Corrupt or incompetent officials must be removed from office. Bad laws must be repealed; ineffective policies changed; and attempts at government overreach halted. Nowadays, political accountability is often equated with electoral democracy: We vote our political leaders into office, and can vote them out if we don't like how they are doing their job. But, this is a very modern view of accountability. Democracy, as we think of it today, with universal adult suffrage, was essentially nonexistent before the 20th century. Different mechanisms of accountability were used in earlier times, when the elites of civil society, rather than the masses, were entrusted with the responsibility of keeping tabs on the government. But, regardless of what specific mechanisms are used, the important thing is that the government is held accountable for how it uses its power.So, these three things are the key to a well-governed society: a strong state, the rule of law, and political accountability. Modern societies in the developed world are generally regarded as having all three. But, even today, there are many countries around the world that don't have all of these requisites for good governance: Some have two of the three; some have only one; and some have none. Why is this the case? Why are some societies less politically developed than others? That's what Francis Fukuyama spends most of this book trying to explain.Using historical case studies from around the world, Fukuyama explores how states first arose out of tribal and feudal societies when neighboring tribes or fiefdoms were forced to unite under a single sovereign power so they could more effectively wage war against distant enemies; how organized religion gave us the concept of law, and established the principle that law ought to be seen as distinct from, and even superior to, the state; and how struggles between the state and independently powerful private interests (e.g. the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and the bourgeoisie) over issues such as taxation and the administration of justice led to the creation of strong parliaments with the authority to say "no" to kings. He also shows why this process didn't occur uniformly around the world: why strong states failed to emerge in places where the pressure to unite against foreign enemies was low; why the rule of law never took root in societies where there was no effective "separation of church and state"; and why political accountability is practically nonexistent in those countries where rulers were able to co-opt or suppress the most powerful private interests within their society.The bulk of "The Origins of Political Order" is devoted to case studies demonstrating how political institutions originated in pre-modern times; but, in the final two chapters, Fukuyama summarizes his ideas about where our political institutions came from, and what this tells us about the course of political development. I won't try to recap the details of his theory here; but I will say that, at least in my view, it gives a convincing explanation of how we got our most important political institutions; and it does so while managing to avoid both the Scylla of historicism and the Charybdis of reductionism.I should note that this book is only the first part of what is planned to be a two-volume set on political development. This first part focuses on the pre-modern era, which covers the period from prehistoric times up to the eve of the French Revolution. The second volume (still unfinished as of this writing) is supposed to pick up where this book leaves off, and examine political development in the modern era. If the second volume is even remotely as good as the first, then I can't wait to read it.