Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt Hardcover – May 19, 2014

I have read Military History since the 1960's and retired as an Army LTC (MI). This terrific book and its sequel bring an insight to the role of German and Russian armored forces that balances previously German-biased interpretations of the Barbarossa campaign and subsequent battles to expel German forces from Soviet Russia. An example of biased interpretations are Paul Carrel's "Hitler Moves East" and "Scorched Earth," fine books in their time and in their own right. Upon reading the great body of WW II literature, at some point one asks, If German doctrine, tactics, tanks, and training were so superior, why did they lose the war? The simplistic answers have always been: Hitler's craziness, Mud, Cold, Russian numerical superiority. This has never fully accounted for and explained German weaknesses at the beginning, middle, and end of the conflict nor has the growth and development of the Russian army been fully explained outside of Russia. Forczyk's research fills this gap and explains how on both operational and strategic scales, German failure was practically inevitable despite some truly remarkable German generalship and indisputably hamstrung Russian defenses through 1942. At the start of Barbarossa The German forces brought a hodgepodge of partially developed tanks, tank destroyers, and motorized equipment from a half dozen countries into the depths of Russia with a complex and poorly resourced supply chain. Superior combined arms doctrine, better TO&E and better unit level tactics were sufficient to overwhelm Russian forces for a long time. However, by the end of 1941, the German weaknesses, particularly poor logistics and reluctance to put Germany on a wartime footing began to erode the invincible aura of the German juggernaut. Forczyk enumerates the throw weight of various tank models and capabilities on both sides, depicting how superior and focused Russian industrial base, bolstered by Lend Lease UK & American Armor replaced depleted armored formations as fast as the Nazis could chew them up. One might speculate that if the Germans had fielded early the Mark III with the high velocity 50mm cannon and placed Germany on wartime footing to fill out all the tank regiments, it might have been a different war. Germany diluted its war efforts by chasing after so many different partially engineered combat vehicles instead of concentrating on extremely high availability of a few armored vehicles. Forczyk makes clear that not only was the MK 5 Panther not the "best tank of WW II," it's insertion into the force with such mammoth technical problems in a retreating army made it on balance a liability for the German Army. It clearly would have been better to make more Tigers and more MK IVs and keep them operating with a simplified supply chain. Forczyk goes on to portray the Russian forces as not only laying down great sacrifices in men and materiel (all true), but also a force at the strategic and operational level the learned and improved over time to tilt the outcome toward success. I have to mention another book PANZER KILLERS: Anti-tank Warfare on the Eastern Front by Artem Drabkin that complements Forczyk's work by adding facts I was previously unaware of. First, I had no idea that the Russians had Tungsten AP ammunition for the 45MM AT gun. Hitler's supply of tungsten was always more scarce than Stalin's. Not relevant to tank warfare but I also didn't know the 45 fired canister "bee hives" and giving it an infantry support role. The role of anti-tank rifles was explained too. I always was puzzled, what could a 14.5mm round do that a 45MM round couldn't? The proliferation of the AT rifles, not un-similar to the Barrett .50 cal on today's battlefield gave the Russians a ubiquitous and formidable weapon to take on formation at range. The rifles account for much of the steady trickle of casualties of tank commanders-vital lieutenants and sergeants whose tactical experience and elan was sapped away by snipers all over the battlefield. If you read the divisional records you see the steady stream of losses that eventually diminished the German army significantly and paved the way for the Russian steamroller of 1943-45. Forczyk's books are one of the best narratives to reinforce the dictum, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Tank Warfare on the Eastern FrontRobert Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front was my first venture into the early stages of the Russo-German War in many years. All my prior reading was contained in books written from the early 1970's and before, therefore the research done with Soviet sources makes for a completely different read than the past histories. This book focuses on the armored conflict of the first two years of this clash of arms, and came per recommendation on a history forum that I often visitAfter having taken a long "vacation" from all things World War II in general, and the Russo-German War in particular, I was, in a sense, refreshed and my interest was renewed. I found Forczyk's book compelling and difficult to put down. Part of this was due to the inclusion of Soviet industrial and war records. Forczyk makes it clear that the Germans had no real technological advantage over the Russians as their conflict began. Quite to the contrary Russian T-34's and KV 1's were superior to anything the Wehrmacht possessed. What the Germans initially had was: superior intelligence and communication; knowledge of use of combined arms (use of infantry, tanks and Luftwaffe) and its efficient employment; and a technological program that adapted rather quickly in the form off anti-tank weaponry that somewhat negated the superior Russian tanks.Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front gives general strategies for opposing forces, but also gives an almost daily tactical breakdown of armored interactions on the three fronts; North; Center; and South. This is one of the books strengths, and at the same time, its Achilles heal. If Forczyk's book has one weakness, it is its lack of maps. Most major strategic locales are located on the few maps with opposing forces, but it is the daily tactical movements that will throw the potential reader for a loop. This has been a flaw in most books dealing with the Russo-German War that I have read. One might hope, at least for more comprehensive maps, with the towns and rivers as described in the book. This would enable the reader a much better chance at visualizing the movement of opposing forces.I also found it interesting to read Forczyk's opinions of some of the individuals involved. One gets the feeling he looked upon Heinz Guderian as a prima donna, and Georgy Zhukov as a lackey and bully for Stalin. Some have offered opinions of Forczyk being over critical of author David Glantz. What I observed was he disagreed with some of the contentions that Glantz put forward, and he explained why.Robert Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front is a compelling book. It explains the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces, and how they both adjusted over time. The lone weakness that neither side could adequately address during the entire conflict was the logistics necessary for the great open spaces involved. Almost eerily, in the appendices, one is able to look at the numerical superiority of tanks produced by Soviet industry compared to that of the Germans. As the Russians adapted and adjusted as the war went on, and their tank crews became better trained, their opponents were caught in a three front meat grinder, and it becomes all to obvious as to the eventual outcome. Soviet losses were dreadful in regard to both manpower and material. German losses increased as the war continued. Whereas Russian manpower seemed limitless, and industrial output continued unfettered, the exact opposite was faced by the Germans, even as they were to eventually embrace the total war philosophy, which by that time, was too late. Forczyk's Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, though focused on the first two years of the war, give the reader a taste of what was to come during the remaining two and one half years. Forczyk's work is a welcome addition to those interested in the history of the clash between Germany and Soviet Russia.

I had originally rated this book higher but in retrospect downgraded it somewhat. The book can be divided into two parts. The part dealing with German Operations upto and including the 2nd Battle of Kharkov is really good (I would rate it a 5) the rest of the book feels really rushed and underdeveloped which leads to faulty conclusions.The section of the book dealing with 1941 and the early 1942 is probably the best summation of armored operations on the Eastern Front for the time period that I have seen. The flawed natured of the German Army, its commanders, and the operations they conducted is very well portaited and will give you a much more truthful picture of how things were when reading other books about Operation Barbarossa. The Soviet side of things is also well described but in my opinion he overrates Soviets capabilities and accomplishments somewhat.The section of the book dealing with Operation Blue and later feels rushed and poorly researched (especially the German side of things). He tries to evaluate the operations of 1942 in the same terms as the operations of 1941. This leads to an erroneous interpretations of events. You really need to read Robert M. Citino's 'Death of the Wehrmacht 1942', to see how Hitler changed the German operational art Before lauching Operation Blue in order to evaluate the following Campaign. Reading Citino's book have the added benefit of giving a lot of the 'why the German did as they did' during the 1941 Campaign.My recommendation is buy the book but be aware that you will need to read at least one other book to put the 1942 section of Forczyk's book into perspective.

The design and technical development of tanks was crucially influenced by the political leaderships of Germany and Russia.Hitler did not begin tank development in earnest until 1934, due to the restrictions of Versailles. Germany had previously cooperated secretly with the Russians on tank development: so Hitler must have been aware of Russia's potential for tank production. But the German High Command did not believe that the Russians had the ability to design a good tank. The Russians moved from tank prototypes to production in two years - where the Germans took five years for the Panzer III and IV. The new Russian T34 was basic but sound, well protected with sloping armour, well gunned, had wide tracks and good ground clearance for deep snow, had good mobility, and had a compressed-air starter. But most importantly it was suitable for mass-production.The existing German tank designs were no match for the sturdy T34 when it was introduced to battle. German tank production was spread across eight different firms and was not geared to mass-production. Nor had designers taken into account the problems of the Russian winter - Hitler believed that the Red Army would collapse quickly, before winter. Hitler was so confident of a Russian collapse that he ordered German industry to curtail ammunition production for the army by autumn. Hitler always had an eye to his own popularity: at home he wanted to preserve an air of normality as far as possible.In winter, German tankers faced the daily prospect of lighting fires under their tanks to warm things up before they could start the engines. No wonder the Red Army preferred early morning attacks. German gaskets were prone to brittleness in the Russian winter, leading to massive oil leaks, and so on. Later German tanks matched the T34 in most respects, but tank production never matched that of Russia. Stalin on the other hand needed only the support of his political cadre. Stalin correctly realised that the war could become a battle of attrition and that a massive production of tanks was likely to be a key to success.Hitler's confidence in a Russian collapse may account for the biggest flaw in German plans: inadequate logistics. German tanks were frequently out of fuel and ammunition due to lack of supplies. Even at the start of the eastern campaign German reserves were inadequate. Long distances on poor roads, and poor weather, were too much for the supply lorries, which were too few; and supply by air was rarely more than supplementary. Facts abound - from the apparently trivial: a T34 needs a minimum of 1Kg of bearing grease every 100 kilometres (but no grease means no bearings, no bearings means no tanks) to broader issues such as the very low skills of early Russian tank crews, probably due to lack of leadership and training caused by Stalin's purge of army officers in the 1930's. One area where Germany did have a clear technical advantage was in radio communications: very poor Russian radio systems meant that many Russian tank actions were totally uncoordinated.Details of tank battles are very fully covered.This Kindle edition is very good value at just over £1.

This book cleared up many of my misapprehensions about the German advance into Russia in 1941-1942.Although from the beginning the Russians had better tanks in the T-34 and KV-1 than the Germans, these were squandered due to Stalin's purges, doctrinaire tactics, lack of training, lack of radios, operating closed, tanks being used piecemeal instead of enmasse, and poor coordination with infantry and airforce.This is all described in detail, indicating the types of tanks involved and the consequences, up to, and including, the Battle of Stalingrad, by which time Russia was beginning to learn from hard lessons but Germany was starting to build tanks to defeat the T-34 and KV-1.I was very pleased that the book also details the use of Lend-lease tanks, such as the Matilda, Valentine, Churchill and U.S. M3 Lee.There are an awful lot of places mentioned so have Google Maps open to find these places, but beware of changes in spellings and name.

Fantastic work with original research that cuts through the dogma plaguing many previous Eastern Front works that relied too heavily on biased memoirs from senior German commanders and/or Soviet propaganda. Forczyk is quickly becoming one of my favourite military historians. I’ve read 3 of his books so far and hope to collect more. He was a tank commander himself, which is obvious in the way he analyses the campaigns he writes about. If you’re in any doubt about buying this (or any of his works), I say go for it!

A fantastic read and a must for any one interested in tank warfare.The book tells the tale of the war on the eastern front from the point of view of the armoured divisions which gives a different perspective of standard histories.Given the importance of the (fewer than you would think) panzer divisions to the German army the factors which affected tank warfare are examined and some myths are exposed.Overall a fantastic readThe sheer level of information (not helped by frequent references to little known Russian towns) made reading heavy going at times.I was tempted to deduct 1 star for the lack of decent maps, but overall the book was too good to not get 5 stars