Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Elements of Philosophy) Second Edition

This book is pretty hard for people trying to learn on their own. It definitely requires a skilled philosopher. There are questions in the back and many notes that help readers to know what BonJour is speaking about. It is a fairly intuitive case against skepticism. BonJour sifts through the ideas of Des Cartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, and others as well as many contemporary ideas. Ultimately BonJour writes a compelling case for Moderate Rationalistic Internal justification of Knowledge.

Received quickly and in excellent condition. This is a text book required for a class, and the purchase and item were very satisfactory.

Expensive, epistemic expansive, exacting in many aspects, a must for any young student of epistemc studies. You will not agree with all the solutions or even the formulation of the problems, but you should enjoy reading the book as it will assist you in expanding your understanding of your knowledge pre-committments.Buy this if you are an alert student or one seeking to make epistemology a part of your intellecutal life; as per most fail to seek in forming their worldview.

You can get this book delivered to your house for under thirty dollars if you order it directly from the publisher.

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On reading this book, I am constantly left asking my question, is the author simply touchingly naive, or is he indulging in deliberate intellectual dishonesty?Why do I ask that? Because argument after argument is deeply, deeply flawed. Let me give an example, in his attempts to justify the concept of a priori truth (i.e. a truth that holds by virtue of itself, that does not require reference to external data to back it up) he returns to the Cartesian chestnut of 2+3=5. He attempts to argue that this is not an instance of logical deduction from definitions, by introducing some of the axiomatics involved in the definition of integers, and so ends up with making 2+3=5 equivalent to ((1+1)+(1+1+1))=(1+1+1+1+1). Fine so far. Here's the naughty bit: he then points out that we have to be able to remove the brackets to get the result (which is true) but says that we can only do this because it is an a priori obvious truth. No: it is an application of the axioms, part of the definition of what an integer is.Here's another example. In attempting to argue for a strong Cartesian epistemology (so knowledge can only be viewed as such if it is absolutely true) he argues against a view based on probability as follows. Say event A has probability 0.9 and event B has probability 0.5. Then their conjunction has probability 0.45, which is less than their individual probabilities. But if the two events both lend credence to a belief, their conjunction should add greater credence, so probability is all wrong. No: the author just fails to understand basic facts about testing. It is precisely the fact that probabilities multiply, and so many events taken together have a joint probability much less than does any one which makes testing work: the lower the probability of what I have seen, the less likely it is to have happened at random, and so the greater support it lends to my hypothesis. If Bonjour's understanding were correct, scientists would never repeat experiments, as multiple results supporting a thesis would seemingly make the thesis' support lessen.A third example. He describes a thought experiment in order to indicate why he believes induction is logically valid [!]. Say I get a fresh cup of clean water and put a sugar cube into it. It dissolves. Say I repeat the experiment with a new cup of water. Same result. So, he argues (I am not making this up) I can conclude that sugar added to water will always dissolve. But then what happens if I, immediately after having announced that this is TRUE (as opposed to merely very likely) happen to plop a sugar cube into a saturated solution? You got it, it won't dissolve. Bonjour's test is not well posed for his hypothesis.I could go on, but I think that will do. These are childish mistakes, hence my contention. Either the author just doesn't really understand the force of the attack on Cartesian epistemology launched by Hume and carried on into this day, or else he does but he is so committed to Cartesianism that he is prepared to be not entirely scrupulous in its defence.Suggested alternate reading: The Pursuit of Truth by W. Quine.

Although it's made as a book for students, this is quite complicated to read as a novice. That being said, once you get the hang of his style of writing, it is a genuinely good book. Bonjour had a lot of valid points throughout, though I don't really have a lot of similar works to compare it with.

Laurence BonJour is one of the leading epistemologists in America. He has written two other books, IN DEFENSE OF PURE REASON and THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE.This book takes as his departure the Cartesian program. Much of the book is a discussion of various epistemological problems analyzed in light of responses to Descartes. (For example, Plato and Aristotle are barely mentioned, and Aquinas isn't mentioned at all.) Many of the current issues in epistemology are discussed, such as foundationalism versus coherentism, and sense-data and adverbial theories of perception. There is a lengthy critique of Quine's "naturalized epistemology."This book is part of a new series called ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPY, which is edited by Robert Audi. Prof. Audi has written a work entitled EPISTEMOLOGY for a different series. That work is also recommended and covers similar ground as Prof. Bonjour's work, but is a little longer.

Goooooood!!