The Mighty and the Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology

One very important book by studying contemporary questions of theology and religions.

IHow does the State’s authority relate to God’s authority? That is the primary question at play in Wolterstorff’s most recent volume addressing political theology - How do the “Mighty” relate to the “Almighty”?Taking cues from the martyrdom account of 2nd century Bishop of Smyrna, St. Polycarp, Wolterstorff seeks to mount a distinctively Christian case for the liberal democratic state. Thus, he aims to accomplish “from above” what he did in Understanding Liberal Democracy “from below”.Polycarp, on trial before Roman proconsul Stadius Quadratus, is commanded to revile Christ and “swear by the tyche of Caesar.” He famously declines, stating, “For eighty and six years have I been his servant, and he has done me no wrong; how can I blaspheme my King, who saved me?”Less famous, however, is Polycarp’s statement that “we [Christians] have been taught to render honour, as is meet, if it hurts us not, to princes and authorities appointed by God.” Wolterstorff lays hold of this statement as paradigmatic for a Christian account of political theology. What we see here, according to Wolterstorff, is the intersection, or, better put, the collision, of two authorities – the authority of the emperor and the authority of God.Controversy is already underway.IITwo extremely significant strands of Christian political theology already object to the way Wolterstorff, allegedly following Polycarp, frames the matter. On the one hand, John Howard Yoder would object, holding that the State does not have any authority. Rather, what states have is “coercive power over their subjects; they do not have authority over them” (18).On the other hand, St. Augustine’s ‘two cities’ formulation would reject “the duality of state authority mediating divine authority and [most acutely he’d reject] an understanding of the duality of Christians being under the authority of both church and state” (35). Augustine, and Stanley Hauerwas at his side, would state in turn that “the authority that civil governments have over Christians should not be thought of as the authority of a state over its citizens but as the authority a state has over aliens residing or traveling in its territory” (36).Wolterstorff considers both objections, the radical Yoderian and the slightly less radical Augustinian, to be deficient. Yet, Wolterstorff’s reasons will be sorely inadequate for those not already in agreement with him. His failure to deliver in this area consequently renders the tenability of the rest of his project deeply ambiguous.First off, his treatment of Yoder left me uneasy. It was little more than a brief exposition followed by a lax dismissal. So, while I appreciate that Wolterstorff does choose to engage Yoder, his consideration comes across as insincere – as though Yoder was more of an obstacle to overcome than a serious interlocutor. This unfortunate approach will likely frustrate those sympathetic to Yoder’s thought.I should add that I am no expert in Yoder’s works (I haven’t even read The Politics of Jesus), so I can’t speak to the accuracy of Wolterstorff’s representation. I’ll have to leave that task to a more faithful Mennonite. Rather, I’ll direct my evaluation exclusively at how Wolterstorff critique of the Yoder he portrays.Crucial to Wolterstorff’s objection to Yoder is that where Yoder wants to claim that the state, as a social structure, is a once good, but now fallen power – and thus without any claim to legitimate authority, Wolterstorff denies any identification of the state with the Pauline “powers” that Christ subverts. According to Wolterstorff, “the state is not supra-natural”, as the “powers” presumably are (23). He concedes “our states and other social structures are under the influence of fallen powers. But they are not identical” (23).I want to tread carefully here, because I think he is right that social structures, such as the state, are not quite identical to “the powers”, but the question remains whether they separable? Or are they an irremediable fusion. Because if they are indissoluble, then it seems that Wolterstorff’s objection is impotent. Especially noting that a structure, as an abstract entity, if manipulated becomes something entirely different. It’s whole substance changes. Thus, fallen powers are entirely distinct from prelapsarian powers.This is significant because Wolterstorff still thinks a just state can be achieved – one that mediates God’s authority by upholding human rights established by natural law. However, if as Yoder argues, the state is hopelessly corrupt, then it is impossible to conceive of a just nation, and thus, Christians are left with an ambivalent relationship to all forms of government. While I may be labeled a pessimist, I actually align with this suspicion toward all nation-states/governments (actually, I won’t be labeled a pessimist, just a Millenial captive to the culture of government distrust – so be it!).William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence has stoked this suspicion. Against Wolterstorff, the nation-state is a “supra-natural” entity – one that is well conceived in transcendent terms. Each state contains its own mythos and soteriology, often in a way incompatible with allegiance to Jesus. They offer a feigned sense of solidarity and, as a quasi-religious practice, the State repeatedly sacrifices its men and women at the altar of war, achieving self-preservation through blood. And crucially, I must add, that is not an abhorrent conception of the state – it is the norm.One more objection of Wolterstorff must be treated. He argues that Yoder’s identification of the “powers” with social structures leads to a demonic ecclesiology. For if the church is a social structure, then it too must be one of the “powers” that enslave and kill. This problem is easily fixed. If the Church is conceived of as a particular, eschatological, Spirit-filled community – the mystical Body of Christ – then we are compelled to proclaim its purity, at the level of structure, from the “powers.”Enough on Yoder. Now onto Augustine and company.IIIIf Yoder was a mountain to climb over, then Augustine is a mountain and a half. He avoids many of Yoder’s more questionable claims, while maintaining a political theology that is unswerving in its allegiance to Christ and is deeply cautious of the earthy polis. On the ground level, Augustinian political theology allows a pacifist Church that is heavily critical of nationalism and locates the Church as the center of the politics of Jesus.Why does Wolterstorff object to Augustine? Due to Augustine’s rejection of the state’s authority over the Church as that of a “state over its citizens” (36). Rather, Augustine, and most notably Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, conceive of that state’s authority “as the authority a state has over aliens residing or traveling in its territory” (36). Thus, the “two cities”: the Earthly city and the Heavenly city (the City of God). And these two cities do not overlap in membership, because each city is a distinct people “determined by two opposing kinds of love” (38). “The one seeks glory from men, the other finds its highest glory in God” (quoted from City of God).So, once again, we see the real problem for Wolterstorff: an ambiguous stance toward the state. The state is conceived of as inherently problematic, being driven by a love that is incompatible with Christian love. Wolterstorff sums it up well:The picture is of two distinct peoples, their peoplehood defined by their religio-moral unity, each having its own government. (41)The more precise problem for Wolterstorff is that the “Earthly city” is not relegated authority over the citizens of the “Heavenly city”. Thus, Augustine precludes any possibility for Wolterstorff to speak of the State mediating divine authority over Christians.So how does Wolterstorff counter Augustine? By the promise of the secular nation-state.Augustine, at his time in history, could not conceive of a nation that didn’t coincide with some set of religious sentiments. But now, apparently, we can. It is possible to be a faithful Christian, while being a faithful citizen. Those two are not in conflict. But how? Is it by making a Christian nation? No. Rather, it is by making a pluralist nation that is committed to the freedom of religion for all people.It should be clear that I don’t find this line of argument persuasive in the slightest. I do not subscribe to the myth of secularism. I would stand with those who argue “that every state does in fact implicitly establish some non-Christian religion or life-orientation; every state is in fact the state of and for some non-Christian religio-ethical community” (42).Unfortunately, though Wolterstorff tips his hat to that objection, he offers no reply, lamenting that the address “would require an essay of its own” (43). Perhaps he should have waited to write this book until that essay was complete.The formidable Augustine remains a mountain that Wolterstorff could not traverse.IVWhile I’ve only considered the first few chapters, they are, in my view, the most crucial, being the props that support his entire proposal. Thus, I’ve devoted the majority of my time to exposing their weaknesses. However, it’s only proper that I offer a brief word on where he goes with the rest of the volume. Not only because the nature of review require it, but because, frankly, there are several more doubtful spots.He devotes three chapters to discussing different forms of authority, which he later employs in his reading of Romans 13. They are helpful exploration on the many forms authority can take, however, this is certainly the most tedious section in his work. He then demonstrates, using the typology that he has just developed, how Romans 13 has traditionally be interpreted, with particular attention to John Calvin. This traditional interpretation consequently serves as the foil for his next chapter that is meant to be an innovative reading of Paul that justifies both liberal democracy and Christian opposition to unjust states.He determines that Calvin was working with a model granting the State “positional authority”, a model on which the state occupies “an institutional position that authorizes one to issue directives to others” (79). Accordingly, the one in that position is granted authority to command anything, however that does not mean they have the moral right to do so. Wolterstorff objects to this reading, claiming that the State does not actually have the authority to make unjust commands. In his exposition of Romans 13, he argues that Paul grants the state a delegated authority, which means having “the authority to do something [particular]” (88). And it is only this delegated task that the state has the authority to do. If it seeks to do something else, it is not abusing its authority – it doesn’t actually have the authority. Thus, Christians, while submitting to state authority, need not submit to its demands when they outside of its delegated task.What is that delegated task? To curb wrongdoing.Here a weakness arises in Wolterstorff’s argument. He concludes from his argument that the State is delegated the authority to curb wrongdoing that:Government does this by publishing a law code which specifies actions that are forbidden and which attaches coercive sanctions to those laws, by establishing a judiciary to determine whether someone has violated the law and to order a punishment in case it determines that he has, by setting up a police force to prevent or deter violations of the law, and by maintain a military. (90)So far I am not in particular disagreement, even though it seems quite the jump. But he goes farther. Because the State is meant to curb wrong, or injustice, then that means that the State is meant to protect rights, for the transgression of individual rights is injustice. If you’re not sure where we have arrived… it’s the modern liberal nation-state.Isn’t that convenient?It’s not that I am opposed to individual rights – I certainly am not. But I am not sure Wolterstorff can do what Romans 13 what he wants to. His argument is blatantly teleological. He arrives exactly where he wanted to. Without any consideration of the other New Testament evidence and, most painfully, of Jesus! This does not mean he is faulted, but it does justify caution. Especially when he reads Paul’s term 'exousia' as speaking of the nation-state. Once again, that seems a leap.My main concern, though, is that there are not legitimate, autonomous, rational grounds on which to establish these rights that we are to protect. I am aware that Wolterstorff has made his case for this elsewhere, so I can’t fault him, however, it does harm my reading of him.I will grant Wolterstorff a strong critique against the Lutheran Two Rules doctrine. He shows it to be utterly unpersuasive relying too much on a particular, contingent societal arrangement that could not possibly exist in pluralist Modernity or Post-Modernity. Yet, that treatment is unnecessary here as I’ve already exceeded proper length.VIn closing, Wolterstorff does not deliver. He has written an intelligent, informed, but ultimately unpersuasive theological case for the liberal nation-state. I suggest that this is for a simple reason: Paul wasn’t imagining the liberal nation-state when he wrote Romans. Wolterstorff is brilliant, but he appears too driven by a pre-commitment to American political ideals. I highly doubt that anyone would arrive at this reading of Paul if it were not for already being situated in a liberal democracy.Read this book. Wrestle with his arguments. But beware of the danger of being an American before being a Christian. As Stanley Hauerwas has said, that is one of the greatest threats to a faithful reading of Scripture.Let us read, conscious of our communion with the saints, remembering the witness of the martyrs, striving to represent the crucified-but-Risen Messiah in all that we do.NOTE: This book was provided free of charge in exchange for an honest review.

This book engages the important question of how God's authority is related to the authority of the state (2). It is a extended reflection in political theology, that is, thinking in a Christian way about the nature and authority of the state. The book comes out of lectures given by Wolterstorff in 1998, but, interestingly, he says he wasn't happy with the lectures in the form he delivered them (vi), so he set the material aside and returned to it occasionally over the intervening fourteen years, in the course of his other work, arriving at the product produced in this book. The book still retains much of the lecture "feel," in its direct tone and light annotation, but this isn't a deficit, and in fact makes what may otherwise have been overly technical accessible to the interested reader.Wolterstorff's reflections are built on the character of Polycarp, one of Christianity's early martyrs, who exhibited an almost paradoxical allegiance to Jesus Christ and a recognition of the state. Out of Polycarp's situation, Wolterstorff recognizes two key dualities: "the duality of the authority of the state mediating the authority of God, and the duality of Christians being under the authority of both church and state." It is the exploration of these dualities that occupies the remainder of the book.After looking at two possible objections to his framing of the situation (one from Yoder and one based on the "two-cities" understanding), he goes on to explore the nature of authority, of government, and of the specific authority to govern. These provide the reader with helpful summaries of what are obviously complex issues, laying important groundwork for the exposition to come. And after investigating Calvin's understanding of the relationship of God's authority and that of the state, he moves on to look at Romans 13, one of the key texts for Christian reflection on the stage.The chapter on Paul really forms the heart of the book, both because of the historical prominence of this chapter in past Christian thought and because of the fruitfulness of his rereading of the passage. Without going into the details, two key points go together. This first is that most interpreters have looked at the passage and seen the first verse, emphasizing government's God-given authority, as the key to interpretation, whereas Wolterstorff asserts (not without warrant, I think) that verses four and five, which detail more specifically what government is and why it has been so authorized by God (emphasizing government's role as God's agent to curb wrongdoing). He asserts, "With verse 4 in mind, our immediate thought is that they [governing authorities] are not just instituted, period, full stop. . . . we know that they are instituted to do something, appointed to do something" (94). This interpretation is certainly not new, but what is more novel is that, in his argument, this dovetails with an earlier point in his discussion regarding the nature of authority, where he differentiated between positional authority (that is, actions one possesses the power to enact by virtue of a position of authority) and performance authority (that is, actions that one has been given permission to undertake; 48). While many Christian interpreters have assumed something resembling the first understanding of authority when looking at Romans 13, Wolterstorff asserts that Paul has in mind the latter. This key interpretive move is at the heart of his argument. And he takes his conclusion one important step further. He asserts that the outline of government in Romans 13 would thus imply that government is to be a rights-honoring institution, since transgressing rights is in fact injustice and governments are tasked with punishing, not perpetrating, injustice. This leads him down a path he didn't fully expect at the outset of his own work: "I found a case for the liberal democratic state gradually emerging--albeit for a less individualistic understanding of the liberal democratic state than is common" (5).Wolterstorff's clearly written book does an outstanding job of formulating (or at least pointing toward) a theology of government, one that has potential to bear much fruit. Readers interested in questions of politics and theology will do well to take this work into account. Likewise, those interested in Pauline theology or Romans will likewise benefit from engaging with his reading of Romans 13. The book is scholarly, but also concise and direct, making it manageable for the interested general reader, and I hope many pick it up. I look forward to engaging more with his thoughtful writing, for I think it can illuminate why conflicts between religious and political spheres do in fact occur, and help us navigate a path through them that is true to the nature of each, all the while being ultimately faithful to the sovereign Lord who holds our full and ultimate allegiance.